Roll Away the Stone!

by Dennis Green

General McChrystal revisited. A close examination of the Rolling Stone article, (I subscribe!), reveals that it’s about a lot more than loose lips, but rather a huge failure of policy. Counter-Insurgency, (COIN), may have worked to some degree in Iraq, but it isn’t working in Afghanistan at all. McChrystal was fast losing the support of President Karzai, Ambassador Hollbroke, Vice President Biden, Secretary of State Clinton, and even his own men.

COIN assumes a large degree of nation-building parallel to the armed combat pushing the Taliban our of certain villages and regions. That requires a strong and respected central government, a clear distinction between civilians and the enemy, and an ability to protect those civilians from intimidation and slaughter by the enemy, and also by our own troops. Avoiding that “collateral damage,” McChrystal’s own fighters claim, is impossible in Afghanistan. “So all a Taliban fighter has to do is lay down his gun, and he’s an innocent civilian and we can’t fire on him or defend ourselves!” says one.

If you roll away the Rolling Stone, you get a view of that war that you won’t see on TV, especially on Fox Noose. The article reveals a bitter division between command and fighting force that we haven’t seen since the worst days of Vietnam. The twisted logic of our presence there also alienates the American public from the conflict in ways we haven’t seen since ‘Nam either.

I can just imagine…well, I don’t have to…I can hear their voices in this article, what it feels like to be risking your life in an unpopular war hampered by an unworkable policy and a strategy that puts you out there, vulnerable to attack by IED or sniper, not being able to tell the enemy from the friend…strike that…having no friends, but surrounded by suspicious and hostile villagers who may not shoot you…may not harbor those who will…no win, no “victory” possible, just more stalemate.

During the last half of the 70s, most of the 80s and 90s, the U.S. military was frustrated by the failure of Vietnam. This frustration shows in McChrystal’s voice as he chaffs against those who disagree with him. In fact, as the reporter for Rolling Stone and his editors say, the General had the opportunity to review the article before its publication, for fact-checking. He knew exactly what was in it and how it would be received. He is quoted as saying he wanted to “send a message” back to Washington with its content.

He had sent messages before — with a speech in London, for example, during Obama’s period of assessment, calling for 40,000 more troops and a confirmation of his policy, preempting his Commander-in-Chief. He had been warned, and obviously ignored the warning. But the issue here is more than a Top General with very poor judgment. It is a question of why in the hell are we there at all, and especially pursuing a doomed strategy.

There are no Sunnis in Afghanistan, as there are in Iraq. Afghanistan is a failed state that was easily, after the Soviet defeat, taken over by an Islamic Extremist party, the Taliban, easily pushed aside by our invasion, but barely kept contained as an insurgency.

The alternative is a “Counter-Terrorist” strategy that contains and winnows away at Al Qaeda with drones, keeps very few troops on the ground defending the borders, and lets the Afghanis decide how to deal with the Taliban.

The right wing here claims that it’s the deadline for the beginning of withdrawal that makes the COIN policy unworkable. That shows the same fundamental misunderstanding of Afgani culture, society and politics that General McChrystal displayed. And even his own troops saw through that myth.

©2010 Dennis Green